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destroyed.3 2 For example, if the testator left a heavily indebted estate
which, due to financial complexities, required an extended period of
administration, the interest and administration expenses borne solely
by principal could conceivably deplete the entire corpus. Meantime,
the income beneficiary would enjoy the full income from the prop-
erties which were subsequently sold to pay the indebtedness and
other charges against the estate. Thus an attempt to establish a resi-
duary trust for successive beneficiaries would be converted into a
specific bequest of probate income. In dealing with such a problem,
the court need only remember that the rule which it has adopted is
a rule of construction, not a rule of law. The court should not limit
itself to the four corners of the will as suggested in the principal case,
but the trustees, executors and court should consider the financial
circumstances surrounding the estate before making a conclusive de-
termination of the testator's intent. In some cases the court may find
an application under one of the other rules to be more consistent
with testator's intent.
The court in the Whitman case not only solves the allocation
problem by adopting the Massachusetts Rule, it vividly reminds the
practitioner and testator to specifically consider the subject of pro-
bate income in drafting the testator's will.
K. Sidney Neuman
WORKMN'S COMPENSATION-OccuPATIONAL DIsEASE-INJUmous Ex-
PosuRE-Claimant was employed as a mine motor car operator for
twenty-three months by the defendant from whom he sought com-
pensation for total permanent disability resulting from silicosis. Med-
ical testimony established that he had some degree of silicosis prior
to this employment, but that it had not reached the disabling stage.
There was evidence that in this employment claimant was exposed
for several hours a day to dust from sand used for wheel traction.
Some nine months after beginning work the claimant experienced
shortness of breath. Then over a year later a medical examination
revealed silicosis which had progressed to the disabling stage.
Claimant thereafter applied to the Workmen's Compensation Board
for an award of compensation. The referee's report recommending
such an award was set aside by the board, three members of the
five-member board sitting, one of the three dissenting. Compensation
was denied on the ground that claimant had not sufficiently proved
32 See examples in Tilghman v. Frazer, 199 Md. 620, 87 A.2d 811 (1952);
In re Freehely's Estate, 179 Ore. 250, 170 P.2d 757 (1946).
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an injurious exposure to the hazard of silicosis during his employ-
ment with the defendant. Notwithstanding a subsequent order of the
board declaring this opinion a nullity because it did not have a
concurrence of a majority of the full Board, claimant appealed to
the circuit court on the merits. The circuit court affirmed the original
order of the Board, and in addition held that claimant had failed to
give timely notice of the disability to his employer. Held: Reversed
and remanded. In order for a final order of the board to be valid it
must have been approved by a majority of all of the members.
Childers v. Hackney's Creek Coal Co., 837 S.W.2d 680 (Ky. 1960).
Because of its importance the court then discussed the substan-
tive issue of whether the evidence was sufficient to support a finding
that claimant had been injuriously exposed while working for the
defendant. In concluding that the evidence was sufficient, it was
necessary to interpret the following statutory definition of "injurious
exposure" found in the Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Act:
"Injurious exposure" as used in this section shall mean that exposure
to occupational hazard which would, independently of any other
cause whatsoever, produce or cause the disease for which claim
is made. 1
In its interpretation of this definition the court also took into
consideration Ky. Rev. Stat. section 342.316(12), which provides:
When an employe has an occupational disease that is covered by
this chapter, the employer in whose employment he was last in-
juriously exposed to the hazard of the disease, . . . shall be liable
therefor, without right to contribution from any prior employer....
Interpreted literally, these two subsections read together seem
to mean that a claimant must prove that his exposure to the occu-
pational hazard during his last employment was such that it would
have caused the disabling disease had he been subjected to no pre-
vious exposure whatsoever. This interpretation appears to be proper
when applied to cases where the claimant seeks compensation for
disability resulting from a disease normally caused by a relatively
short period of exposure such as carbon monoxide poisoning 2 It
also appears proper when applied to cases where the claimant has not
not been exposed to the hazards of his disease in any prior employ-
ment. In each instance the claimant's disability has been caused
solely by his exposure in one particular employment and his em-
ployer at that time is the one from whom he must seek compensa-
tion.
IKy. Rev. Stat. § 342.316(1)(b) (1960).
2 See, e.g., 2 Gray, Attorneys' Textbook of Medicine § 140.04 (3d ed. 1958).
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The defect in this interpretation becomes apparent however when
applied to cases where a claimant has contracted an occupational
disease which becomes disabling only after long periods of exposure
and it is shown that he was exposed to the hazards of the disease
in some prior employment. Silicosis cases can provide us with a good
example of this. The average silicosis claimant will have been ex-
posed to the hazards of the disease for ten to fifteen years before
symptoms of the disease begin to appear.3 Very rarely, and then
only when certain extreme conditions exist, silicosis develops after
two to four and one-half years of exposure.4
Disability from silicosis is caused by the accumulation of silicon
dioxide in crystalline form in the alveoli, or air sacs, at the extreme
ends of the bronchioles of the lungs.5 The minute particles of silica
very slowly over the years react with the alkali juices producing a
poison which kills those tissue cells close at hand." The body attempts
to wall off this poisoned area by building up fibrotic scar tissue
around it.7 After this fibrosis has been occurring for a number of years
and the amount of live tissue has been greatly reduced, symptoms
of air deficiency begin to appear, shortness of breath occurs upon
exertion, resistance to lung infections is decreased, and usually some
other lung disease such as tuberculosis or pneumonia eventually sets
in, often causing death.8 It is quite possible for a person to be ex-
posed to harmful quantities of silica dust for several years and still
not experience a build-up of fibrotic tissue in his lungs sufficient to
cause any disability.9
Now assume a situation where the claimant has become disabled
after working in the coal mines for twelve years, the first six years
under one employer and the remaining six years under his present
employer, the hazards of silicosis being about the same in each em-
ployment. Had he left the mines after the first six years the accumu-
lation of silica dust in his lungs would probably not have been great
enough to cause any disability. Likewise, had it not been for the
first six years of exposure, his exposure while working for his present
employer would not alone have been sufficient to cause any disability.
Under the literal interpretation of these two subsections the claimant
32 Gray, op. cit. supra note 2, § 147.11.
4 "These cases are only possible with inhalation of free silica mixed with a
strong alkali, as with washing powder containing finely ground sand and soap."
2 Gray, op. cit. supra note 2, § 147.08.
5 2 Gray, op. cit. supra note 2, § 147.02.
6 2 Gray, op. cit. supra note 2, § 147.07.
7 2 Gray, op. cit. supra note 2, § 147.07.
8 2 Gray, op. cit. supra note 2, § 147.08.
9 2 Gray, op cit. supra note 2, § 147.08.
[Vol. 49,
RECENT CASES
would be unable to say that he had been injuriously exposed during
either period of employment and would therefore be denied com-
pensation.
Hypothetically this same result would follow had the claimant
been exposed to silica dust for twelve years in his first employment
and only a few days in his present employment. Had the court ac-
cepted this interpretation in the principal case it would have estab-
lished a rule clearly contrary to the intent and purpose of the Work-
men's Compensation Act: to award compensation to industrial em-
ployees for disabilities caused by traumatic personal injuries and
occupational diseases arising out of and in the course of employment.10
The court, however, recognized the inherent defect in the literal
interpretation and construed the meaning of the statutory definition
of injurious exposure so that the intent and purpose of the Act may
be carried out in future cases. It said:
All that is required under KRS 842.316(1)(b) is that the exposure
be such as could cause the disease independently of any other cause.
It will be noted that under neither of the cited subsections is there
any minimum time requirement for the period of exposure. Ac-
cordingly, it is not required that the employe prove that he did
contract silicosis in his last employment, but only that the condi-
tions were such that they could cause the disease over some in-
definite period of time.1 '
This interpretation of injurious exposure, while giving effect to the
intent of the Act, will lead to some rather undesirable results if ap-
plied literally to all cases. By returning to the hypothetical case it is
quite readily seen that the last employer of a silicosis claimant, al-
though he received the services of the claimant for only a short period
of time, will be liable for all compensation granted to the claimant
without right to contribution from a previous employer who may
have received by far the greatest benefit from the claimant's serv-
ices.12 It is even conceivable that an employer might be tempted to
10 See Benito Mining Co. v. Girdner, 271 Ky. 87, 111 S.W.2d 571 (1938).
11 Childers v. Hackney's Creek Coal Co., 337 S.W.2d 680, 683 (Ky. 1960).
This interpretation was held to be controlling in Blue Diamond Coal Co. v.
Napier, 337 S.W.2d 879 (Ky. 1960).
1See Osborne Mining Co. v. Davidson, 339 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1960), de-
cided after the principal case. In January, 1955, claimant, after 30 years of work
in the same mine, experienced shortness of breath and chest pains. He submitted
to an examination which revealed silicosis in the second stage. Five months
thereafter the defendant purchased the mine. Claimant continued working in
the mine for the defendant until filing his claim for compensation some three
years and three months later. The court ruled that the evidence clearly estab-
lished that claimant was injuriously exposed to the hazards of silica dust during
his employment by the defendant and-that under Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.316(12)
the defendant alone was liable for his compensation. This illustrates the in-
equitable consequence which may result from the court's interpretation of the
two subsections under consideration being applied to all cases.
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discharge an employee whom he believes to be on the verge of be-
coming disabled, with the hope that some other mine operator will
employ him and thereby become liable for any subsequent disability.
The most logical way to prevent such results would seem to be
by revision of the statute. This could best be done by drafting a new
and separate section to cover silicosis and other similar diseases
which cause disability only after a prolonged exposure. The section
should make the last employer primarily liable for compensation,
but should give him the right to contribution from previous em-
ployers in whose employment the claimant was exposed to the haz-
ards of the disease causing disability.13 The share of the total compen-
sation to be borne by each employer should be proportional to the
duration of the exposure which the claimant suffered while working
for that particular employer. 14 In order to place some limitation upon
the extent of litigation brought about by such suits, the last em-
ployer might well be limited to actions against those employers in
whose employ the claimant was exposed during a prescribed number
of years before the disability occurred. 1 5 Such a statute would spread
the burden of compensating for such occupational diseases more
evenly among employers directly concerned with some portion of
claimant's hazardous exposure, thereby relieving the inequitable
burden presently placed upon the last employer.
William E. Gary, III
13 2 Gray, op. cit. supra note 2, § 147.14.
14Mich. Comp. Laws § 417.9 (1948), provides:
The total compensation due shall be recoverable from the em lo er who
last employed the employee in the employment to the nature otwhich the
disease was due and in which it was contracted. If, however, such disease
was contracted while such employe was in the employment of a prior em-
ployer, the employer who is made liable for the total compensation as
provided by this section may appeal to said board for an apportionment of
such compensation among the several employers who since the contraction
of such disease shall have employed such employe in the employment
to the nature of which the disease was due. Such apportionment shall be
proportioned to the time such employe was employed in the service of
such employers, and shall be determined only after a hearing, notice of
the time and place of which shall have been given to every employer
alleged to be liable for any portion of such compensation. If the board finds
that any portion of such compensation is payable by an employer prior to
the employer who is made liable for the total compensation as provided
by this section, it shall make an award accordingly in favor of the last
employer, and such award may be enforced in the same manner as an award
for compensation.
15 Such a statute might well impose a twelve year limitation on actions for
contribution, this being a fair average of the period of exposure usually experi-
enced before symptoms of silicosis begin to appear. See 2 Gray, op. cit. supra
note 2, § 147.11.
